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PUBLIC HEALTH ENDANGERMENT AND STANDARDS 
OF PROOF: ETHYL CORP. V. EPA 
Thomas Drechsler* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Clean Air Act l authorizes the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to regulate automobile air pollutants in two ways. 
Section 202(a)2 allows the EPA to regulate the ultimate exhaust 
products of automobile engines regardless of the fuel used. Section 
211(c)(1)(A),3 on the other hand, permits regulation of the types of 
fuel and fuel additives available for autos. 
In January, 1971, the EPA announced its intention to consider 
regulation of the lead content of retail gasoline under § 211.4 In 
December, 1973, the EPA promulgated regulations which required 
a reduction of the average lead concentration in gasoline from 1.7 
to .5 grams/gallon.5 Several manufacturers of lead additives chal-
lenged the regulations in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, and in January, 1975, a three-judge panel set 
* Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
I 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970). 
2 [d. § 1857f-1(a). 
3 Section 211(c)(1) provides: 
The Administrator may. . . by regulation, control or prohibit the manufacture, introduc-
tion into commerce, offering for sale, or sale of any fuel or fuel additive for use in a motor 
vehicle or motor vehicle engine (A) if any emission products of such fuel or fuel additive 
will endanger the public health or welfare, or (B) if emission products of such fuel or fuel 
additive will impair to a significant degree the performance of any emission control device 
or system which is in general use, or which the Administrator finds has been developed 
to a point where in a reasonable time it would be in general use were such regulation to 
be promulgated. 
[d. § 1857f-6(c)(1)(A). Note that § 211(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6(c)(2)(A) (1970), requires 
the EPA to consider regulation under § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1 (1970), before utilizing § 
211(c)(1)(A). 
• 36 Fed. Reg. 1486 (1971). 
s 40 C.F.R. § 80.20 (1976). 
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the regulations aside.s The EPA moved for a rehearing by the full 
court. The motion was granted and on March 19, 1976, a sharply 
split court reversed the three-judge panel and upheld the EPA lead 
regulations in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA. 7 
The decision in Ethyl is significant for two reasons. First, it is the 
initial interpretation of § 211(c)(1)(A). Second, it announces the 
standard of review the court will apply to EPA scientific fact deci-
sions. The case will control future judicial review of EPA fuel and 
fuel additive regulations by the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, the only court with jurisdiction to review such 
regulations. R 
Although Ethyl poses a number of legal questions, this article will 
discuss and analyze its three major issues: 9 the statutory require-
ment for regulation under § 211(c)(1)(A); the standard of judicial 
review to be applied to the EPA regulations; and the court's applica-
tion of the standard to the EPA decision to regulate lead additives 
in automobile fuels. 
II. THE STATUTORY DECISION TO REGULATE 
The Ethyl court's first determination was whether the EPA had 
correctly interpreted the statutory requirement for regulation of fuel 
additives.1O Section 211(c)(1)(A) provides that the EPA may regu-
late or prohibit a fuel or fuel additive only if "any emission products 
of such fuel or fuel additive will endanger the public health or wel-
fare."11 The major controversy disputes the standard for the type 
and amount of evidence required to meet the "will endanger" test. 
The EPA interpreted "will endanger" as requiring evidence suffi-
cient to establish that leaded gas emissions present a "significant 
risk of harm" to the public healthY The EPA found that auto lead 
emissions did constitute a "significant risk of harm" by assessing 
• Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 7 ENVT'L REp. CASES 1353 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 1975). 
7 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The court upheld the regulations in a 5 to 4 decision. 
, Regulations promulgated under § 211(c)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6(c)(1)(A) (1970), are 
reviewable only by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Id. § 1857h-
5(b)(1). 
• The opinion contained a discussion of several other issues: (1) the sufficiency of the 
number of comment periods, 541 F.2d at 48; (2) the practical availability for comment of some 
of the evidence relied upon by the EPA, id. at 49 n.102; and (3) the basis of the rule-making 
decision upon legislative type policy judgments as opposed to the facts alone. 
'0 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1970). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6(c)(I)(A) (1970). 
12 541 F.2d at 12. 
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the probability of harm to the public from lead and the severity of 
that harm. 13 Both factors were determined in light of the cumulative 
health impact of auto lead emissions combined with other lead 
sources. 14 According to this sliding scale test, the public health may 
be endangered by a low probability of a very severe harm, or a high 
probability of a less severe harm. 15 
Manufacturers of lead additives disagreed with the EPA's defini-
tion of "will endanger" and, relying in part on their view of Con-
gress' intent,18 argued that a high quantum of proof of actual harm, 
as opposed to a significant risk of harm, was required by the stat-
uteY In addition, the manufacturers claimed that the EPA erred by 
considering the cumulative health impact of auto lead emissions 
and other lead sources, asserting that EPA regulation is appropriate 
only if auto lead emissions endanger in and of themselves. 18 
The majority accepted the EPA's interpretation of the amount of 
evidence required to meet the "will endanger" standard and then 
held, based upon an analysis of legislative intent, that this standard 
"does not require proof of actual harm before regulation is appropri-
ate."ID The majority explained that a requirement of proof of actual 
harm would reduce the preventive effectiveness of regulations, a 
result inconsistent with the precautionary purpose of the statute.20 
The court also upheld the EPA's reliance on the cumulative 
health impact of auto lead emissions. The court reasoned that the 
effect of one lead source is "meaningful only in cumulative terms"21 
and that "determining the effect of lead automobile emissions, by 
themselves, on human health is of no more practical value than 
finding the incremental effect on health of the fifteenth sleeping pill 
t3 [d. at 18. 
U [d. at 29. 
15 [d. at 18. 
" The manufacturers argued that the threshold decisions to regulate under § 108(a)(1)(A), 
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3(a)(1)(A) (1970), and § 202(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-(1)(a)(1) (1970), of 
the Clean Air Act require less evidence of actual harm than § 211(c)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-
6(c)(1)(A) (1970), thus evincing the intent of Congress to make § 211 particularly stringent. 
541 F.2d at 14. The majority rejected the manufacturers' claim, concluding that the § 
202( a)( 1) standard of "endanger" was equivalent to that of the § 211 (c)( 1 )(A) "will endanger" 
standard. The majority also found that the § lOS(a)(l)(A) standard was more stringent than 
§ 211(c)(1)(A) since § lOS requires an actual "adverse effect," while § 211 only requires 
endangerment. See note 23, infra. 
17 541 F.2d at 12. 
,. [d. at 29. 
" [d. at 17. 
'" [d. 
21 [d. at 30. 
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swallowed by a would-be suicide. "22 The majority rejected the man-
ufacturers' contention that Congress intended, in § 211(c)(1)(A), a 
stricter standard than those established by other sections of the 
Clean Air Act. 23 Rather, the court found the "will endanger" stan-
dard mild in comparison to the threshold standards of other public 
health statutes.24 
Although the dissent agreed with the cumulative impact method 
of assessing endangerment,25 it disagreed with the type and amount 
of proof required to meet the statutory "will endanger" test. Judge 
Wilkey, in dissent, defined the amount of evidence required as 
enough to demonstrate a "significant health hazard to a substantial 
portion of the general population."28 This standard contrasts some-
what with the EPA's "significant risk of harm" standard.27 The 
dissent also criticized the majority's failure to require proof of actual 
harm, stating that the only way to prove potential harm is through 
past actual harm or occurrences, either by experience or by experi-
ment.28 Judge Wilkey asserted, "for the court's opinion to hold that 
the Administrator can dispense with proof of actual harm, i. e., what 
has occurred in the past, and can nevertheless somehow determine 
potential harm, is to grant the plainest license for wildest specula-
tion. "29 After setting forth "will endanger" proof requirements, 
Judge Wilkey never applied the requirements to the EPA's lead 
regulation. 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Ethyl discuss the 
type of evidence required to meet the statutory "will endanger" test 
in terms of "actual harm." Actual harm, however, may be inter-
22 [d. at 31. 
23 On Sept. 30, 1976, after the Ethyl decision, a joint Congressional Conference Committee 
reported out S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 122 CONGo REe. H11894 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 
1976). Section 401 of that bill would eliminate the semantic differences between §§ 
211(c)(1)(A), 202(a)(1), and 108(a)(1)(A) by uniformly conforming their threshold standards. 
See H.R. REp. No. 94-1742, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 63 (1976). This bill, however, failed to pass 
before Congress adjourned on October 10, 1976. See note 16, supra. 
u 541 F.2d at 20 n.36 (comparing the "clearly endanger" standard of the Wholesome 
Poultry Products Act, 21 U.S.C. § 454(c) (1970); the Wholesome Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. § 661(c) 
(1970); the Armed Forces Appropriation Authorization, 50 U.S.C. § 1517 (1970); and the 
"imminent and substantial endangerment" standard of the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp. IV 1974); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300i(a), 
1857c-10(6) (Supp. IV 1974). 
25 541 F.2d at 94. 
2. [d. 
27 See text at note 41, infra. 
2' 541 F.2d at 95 . 
.. [d. 
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preted two ways. First, and more narrowly, actual harm may mean 
previous harm from the substance in question, of the same magni-
tude, to the same life forms, and from the same source of that 
su bstance. On the other hand, and more broadly, actual harm 
may imply previous harm from the substance in question, either 
experimentally or naturally observed, in any magnitude, to any 
comparable life form, from any source. The narrow interpretation 
requires that the past harm be identical in every way with that 
anticipated, while the broad interpretation simply requires that the 
harmful substances be identical. The persuasiveness of the major-
ity's treatment of the evidentiary requirement turns upon the inter-
pretation of actual harm. 
The cases which have defined "will endanger" set forth what is 
not required, as opposed to what is required, to prove public health 
endangerment. Cases interpreting statutory standards similar to § 
211(c)(1)(A)30 do not require a high quantum of proof of a causal link 
between the harm feared and the substance emitted.3t Nor do these 
cases require proof that the harm anticipated has already occurred.32 
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA 33 and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. 
v. EPA,34 held that past actual harm from the substance to be re-
stricted justified regulation. However, these cases also held that 
past actual harm need not be of the same magnitude, to the same 
life forms, or from the same source of the substance as that antici-
pated by the regulations. In Reserve Mining, for example, the court 
held that evidence of past harm to workers inhaling airborne asbes-
tos was sufficient to show endangerment to the general public from 
ingestion of asbestos in the water supply. 35 
If actual harm is read in the narrow sense, the Ethyl majority's 
statement that actual harm is not required to meet the "will endan-
ger" test36 is consistent with the case law.37 Consequently, the dis-
30 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1160(g)(1) (1970) ("pollution of 
waters which is endangering the health or welfare"); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135(b)(C) (1970) ("imminent hazard to the public"). 
31 Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 529 (8th Cir. 1975). Note that this opinion is 
the major decision in a series of cases by the same title. The controversy over where and how 
to dump the asbestos, etc. continues; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 
1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
32 514 F.2d at 519; 510 F.2d at 1299. 
33 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). 
" 510 F.2d 1292 (D. C. Cir. 1975) . 
.. 514 F.2d at 516. 
31 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
31 See notes 29, 31 supra. 
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sent, which would require proof of past actual harm for regulation, 
stands in direct opposition to precedent if actual harm is interpreted 
narrowly. If, however, actual harm is interpreted in the broad sense, 
requiring only proof of some past harm from any source of the sub-
stance, the Ethyl majority opinion does not conform to prior case 
law. Based on the broad definition, the dissent, in requiring proof 
of past actual harm, would be consistent with the case law. 
The question remains as to which interpretation of actual harm, 
broad or narrow, was intended by the Ethyl court; arguments sup-
port either interpretation. On one hand, the dissent, while adopting 
a threshold requirement of proof of actual harm, never holds that 
its requirement is unsatisfied in the case of lead.3s The dissent sim-
ply criticizes the majority's statement that proof of actual harm is 
not required in the § 211(c)(1)(A) "will endanger" conclusion. Past 
actual harm exists in the broad39 but not the narrow sense in the 
case of airborne lead. Since the dissent's requirement of proof of 
actual harm was fulfilled, the dissent probably interpreted actual 
harm and its use by the majority in the broad sense. On the other 
hand, the majority arguably would not reject an actual harm re-
quirement unless it was necessary to do so in deciding the case. This 
reasoning suggests that the majority interpreted actual harm nar-
rowly. Thus, although the dissent's broad interpretation of the ma-
jority's use of actual harm is debatable, it clearly indicates that the 
majority's rejection of an actual harm requirement is subject to at 
least two possibly confusing interpretations. 
The majority's interpretation of "will endanger" does not provide 
an affirmative evidentiary requirement and leaves the interpreta-
tion of actual harm open to question. The broad definition would 
be a more satisfactory threshold standard for the type of evidence 
required to meet the "will endanger" test. First, it is an affirmative 
standard which indicates what type of evidence is required to show 
public health endangerment, whereas the majority's vague rejection 
of the actual harm requirement provides no specific guidance. Sec-
.. In dissent, Judge Wilkey criticized the affirmance of the regulation on other grounds, 
while impliedly concurring that lead met the threshold "will endanger" standard. 541 F.2d 
at 110. 
3. Proof of actual harm from lead in the broad sense (harm of any magnitude, from any 
source of the substance, etc.) exists in Ethyl inasmuch as children have died in the past from 
ingestion ofJeaded paint.ld. at 8. No proof of actual harm exists in the narrow sense, however, 
since there is no evidence that any human has suffered harm attributable to inhalation of 
airborne lead. 
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ond, the proposed standard conforms to existing case law because 
proof sufficient to meet the standard is present in each of the cases 
which consider the issue.4o The majority stated that no proof of 
actual harm is required without stating whether actual harm was 
used in the narrow sense or the broad sense. Thus the EPA might 
interpret the majority standard to allow regulation based on suspi-
cion, with no attempt to show harm experimentally or to investigate 
the past history of a substance. The proposed standard would state 
clearly that proof of harm in the broad sense is required and would 
only allow future regulations based upon harm substantiated by 
experiment or past occurrence. 
After determining the type of evidence sufficient to meet the "will 
endanger" test, the amount of evidence required by the statute 
must be considered. The Ethyl majority and the EPA require a 
"significant risk of harm"41 to meet the statutory standard, while 
Judge Wilkey's dissent would require a "significant health hazard 
to a substantial portion of the general population."42 The majority's 
sliding scale, either a high probability of a less severe harm or a 
lesser probability of a more severe harm,43 is far more flexible than 
the dissent's requirement. The Wilkey dissent, in requiring a 
"significant health hazard," sets a minimum severity below which 
regulation would be precluded. The sliding scale test allows regula-
tion of a very severe harm that is extremely likely to occur, even 
though the number of people affected will be small. The dissent's 
standard, however, would require that a "substantial" number of 
people be affected, and again would not allow regulation where 
many people are very likely to be mildly harmed. Thus, the EPA's 
sliding scale would allow regulation in some desirable situations 
when the dissent's standard would not. 
'" See notes 29-34 and accompanying text, supra . 
.. 541 F.2d at 12. In Reserve Mining Co. the court adopted the same sliding scale, relying 
on Judge Wright's dissent in the panel decision in Ethyl. 514 F.2d at 520. 
" 541 F.2d at 94. Compare Environmental Defense FUIld, Inc. v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1297 
(D.C. Cir. 1975). 
to 541 F.2d at 18. Actually three major factors are to be considered on this scale: first, the 
number of individuals that will be affected by the anticipated harm; second, the likelihood 
that the harm will occur; and third, the severity of the harm to each individual. A fourth 
factor of "ability to monitor symptoms" may also be desirable. In some cases, the harm 
anticipated may not be sudden, drastic, or irreversible and thus accurate symptomatic moni-
toring may be necessary. In such cases, progressive reduction of the dangerous substance may 
safely be attempted while measuring the results on a test group, although such a procedure 
may not be feasible in the case of lead absorption. 
----------
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In determining if the correct type and amount of evidence exists 
to fulfill the "will endanger" standard, it must be decided whether 
to consider the health impact of airborne lead alone, or to consider 
the cumulative health impact of airborne lead combined with other 
lead sources. The majority, the dissent, and the EPA adoption of 
the cumulative impact method of assessing endangerment clearly 
conforms with the methods used by the EPA in promulgating past 
regulations. Many harmful substances emanate from both natural 
and man-made sources. The natural sources are generally uncon-
trollable. The EPA focused on the total level of human exposure, 
and established cumulative ambient air standards from undifferen-
tiated sources. The EPA has, for example, set an ambient carbon 
monoxide standard,44 although scientists estimate that man-made 
sources produce only 10% ofthe carbon monoxide found in the air.45 
Man-made carbon monoxide may present a hazard only when 
added to uncontrollable natural carbon monoxide. Thus, the total 
from both sources may exceed the ambient health hazard, justifying 
control of the man-made source.46 The largest source of lead expo-
sure is the diet, a natural and largely uncontrollable source.47 Lead 
emissions from automobiles may not endanger in and of themselves, 
but, as in the case of carbon monoxide, regulation is necessary if, 
combined with uncontrollable sources, the emissions "will endanger 
the public health." 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Having determined that the EPA correctly interpreted § 211(c) 
(l)(A)48 and properly promulgated the lead regulations thereunder 
within its statutory authority, the court reviewed the factual 
merits of the regulation. Section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative 
Procedure Act states that a reviewing court shall overturn agency 
regulations if they are found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."49 The major-
.. 40 C.F.R. § 50.8 (1976). 
" S.J. WILLIAMSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF AIR POLLUTION 328 (1973) . 
.. Another example is EPA regulation of particulate matter. 40 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1976). Scien-
tists estimate that approximately 10% of the total mass of particulate emitted are of man-
made, controllable origin. J. SEINFELD, AIR POLLUTION PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL FUNDAMENTALS 
83 (1975). 
H 541 F.2d at 8. 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6(c)(1)(A) (1970) . 
.. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966). 
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ity and dissenting opinions in Ethyl50 agree as to the standard of 
review, while Judge Bazelon, in a concurring opinion, proposes a 
somewhat different standard. 
The Ethyl majority and dissent rely upon recent Supreme Court 
decisions51 for two general propositions: first, a reviewing court, 
under the § 706(2}(A) standard, must delve into the evidence and 
educate itself thoroughly in order to determine the reasonableness 
of an agency decision;52 second, the rational basis must be articu-
lated by the agency, not by the court. 53 The majority and the dissent 
also agree that technical cases require a reviewing court to examine 
the record thoroughly in order to understand fully the agency deci-
sion."4 The majority and the dissent both cite the "consideration of 
all relevant factors" and the "clear error of judgment" tests, ex-
pressed by the Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe. 55 These tests were used by the Supreme Court in 
reviewing an agency decision under the § 706(2) (A) standard. 
Judge Bazelon, in a concurring opinion, disagrees with both the 
majority and the dissent. He suggests that in highly technical cases 
such asBthyl, reviewing courts must exercise restraint in reviewing 
evidentiary support for decisions: 58 
I doubt judges contribute much to improving the quality of the difficult 
decisions which must be made in highly technical areas when they take 
it upon themselves to decide as did the panel in this case that in assess-
ing the scientific and medical data the Administrator made clear errors 
of judgment. The process of making a de novo evaluation of the scien-
tific evidence inevitably invites judges of opposing views to make 
plausible-sounding, but simplistic, judgments of the relative weight to 
be afforded various pieces of technical data.57 
The Supreme Court interpreted and discussed the standard of 
review set out in § 706(2}(A) in two recent opinions. In Overton 
Park,58 the Secretary of Transportation appropriated funds for high-
'" 541 F.2d at 1. 
" Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Bowman Transp., 
Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281 (1974). Overton Park and Bowman are 
cited almost universally by courts engaged in substantive review of EPA regulations. 
" See 541 F.2d at 35; id. at 97 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
53 [d. at 34 n.73; id. at 100 n.140 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
" [d. at 35; id. at 99 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
55 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
58 541 F.2d at 66 (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
" [d. (footnote deleted). 
50 401 U.S. 402 (1971). For a detailed discussion of Overton Park, see Note, Citizens to 
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way construction through a public park under a statute which re-
quired a prior consideration of alternate routes. The Court reversed, 
holding that a mere statement by the Secretary that he had consid-
ered all relevant factors was an inadequate basis for review under § 
706(2)(A) .59 In Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight System, Inc., 611 the Interstate Commerce Commission 
granted licenses to three motor carriers found to be fit and able to 
serve the public conveniently. The Court affirmed, ruling that the 
Commission had supplied a reasoned basis for its choices among the 
conflicting evidence. 61 
Overton Park and Bowman Transportation establish general cri-
teria to apply in reviewing agency decisions under the § 706(2)(A) 
standard. First, the court must examine the agency's record care-
fully to determine if the agency considered all relevant factors62 and 
supplied a reasoned, rational basis for its decision.63 Second, the 
agency record must supply more than a simple statement that all 
relevant factors were considered; an explanation of which factors 
were relied upon and why must be set forth. 64 Third, when conflict-
ing evidence exists and the agency rejects a reasonable argument, 
the agency, not the reviewing court, must supply a rational, direct 
response in explanation of its choice.65 If these criteria are satisfied, 
there is a presumption in favor of regularity of the agency decision,66 
and the reviewing court should affirm. 
The Ethyl majority and dissent accurately adopted and articu-
lated the definition of the standard of review expressed by the Su-
preme Court. The majority discussed the significance of the "clear 
error of judgment" language in Overton Park,67 finding that "clear 
error of judgment" should not be confused with the "clearly erro-
neous" standard used to review factual findings of a trial court 
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe: Environmental Law and the Scope of Review, 24 STAN. 
L. REv. 1117 (1972). 
" 401 U.S. at 419-20 . 
.. 419 U.S. 281 (1974). 
" [d. at 284. 
R2 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416; Bowman Transp., Inc. 
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. at 285. 
" Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. at 285-86,290 (1974) . 
.. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 419-20 (1971). 
" Compare Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. at 285-86 
with id. at 292-94. 
II Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 415 (1971). 
" [d. at 416. 
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sitting without a jury.8S The majority says that the latter standard 
permits an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the 
trial court, the type of intrusive review which Overton Park prohib-
its.SU The majority concludes that the Supreme Court's use of "clear 
error of judgment" is "best read as no more than an affirmation of 
the traditional [more passive] standard of review."70 The dissent 
agrees with the majority on this point.7I 
Although one court appears to read Overton Park for approval of 
the clearly erroneous standard ofreview,72 other courts, without dis-
cussing the issue, appear to agree with the majority's interpretation, 
and use "clear error of judgment" interchangeably with "arbitrary 
and capricious. "73 The majority interpretation is sound. The Su-
preme Court in Overton Park expressly prohibited the reviewing 
court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency.74 The 
Supreme Court reaffirmed this conclusion by treating the "clear 
error of judgment" language as identical to the "arbitrary and capri-
cious" test in a later case.75 
Judge Bazelon stands virtually alone in contending that courts 
should exercise extraordinary restraint in reviewing highly technical 
agency decisions.78 Overton Park requires a "searching and careful" 
inquiry into the facts77 and the Supreme Court has articulated no 
exception for technical cases.78 
O' Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 n.74. See FED. R. CIY. P. 52(a) . 
.. 401 U.S. at 416. 
7. 541 F.2d at 34-35 n.74. 
71 The dissent adopts the "clear error of judgment" language, id. at 97, and supports its 
application of the standard, id. at 99, with reference to South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 
F .2d 646 Ost Cir. 1974), in which the First Circuit used "clear error of judgment" interchange-
ably with "arbitrary and capricious." [d. at 655. As will be seen in Section IV, infra, the 
dissent never substitutes its judgment for that of the agency but attacks the rationality and 
basis for the EPA conclusions. 
72 See Raitport v. National Bureau of Standards, 385 F. Supp. 1221, 1225 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
73 American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 453, 456, 462 (7th Cir. 1975); Duquesne Light 
Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186, 1193, 1196 (3d Cir. 1975); cf. American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 
540 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir. 1976). 
" 401 U.S. at 416. 
" In Bowman Transportation the Court used the "clear error of judgment" language inter-
changeably with "arbitrary and capricious." Compare 419 U.S. at 285 with id. at 290. 
" Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., concurring). 
77 401 U.S. at 416. 
" See 541 F.2d at 68 (statement of Levanthal, J.). A number of courts have undertaken 
in-depth reviews of EPA regulations. See, e.g., South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 
662 (1st Cir. 1974); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442,447 (7th Cir. 1975); American 
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1045 (3d Cir. 1975); American Petroleum Inst. v. 
EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1029 (10th Cir. 1976); CPC Int'I v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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Comparison between the Bazelon concurrence in Ethyl and Baze-
lon's opinion for the majority in Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF) v. Ruckelshaus,79 reveals the judge's own inconsistency on 
revi&w. In EDF v. Ruckelshaus, the refusal by the Secretary of Agri-
culture to ban DDT pending formal cancellation proceedings was 
remanded for full clarification of the Secretary's failure to articulate 
the factors considered in his decision. so The opinion stated that 
reviewing courts must insist on "strict judicial scrutiny of adminis-
trative action," where that action touches on interests in health, 
life, and liberty.81 Concurring in Ethyl, however, Judge Bazelon 
stated that the court should avoid substantive review and confine 
itself to procedural matters.82 
Judge Bazelon may be proposing two standards of judicial review: 
when the agency decides to regulate, the court must confine itself 
to a review of agency procedures; but when the decision is not to 
regulate, as in EDF v. Ruckelshaus, the court will strictly review the 
substantive record. This approach would create a presumption in 
favor of regulations, and such a presumption may be necessary to 
protect the public health. However, the Supreme Court specifically 
stated in Overton Park that any agency decision is entitled to a 
"presumption of regularity. "83 
IV. ApPLICATION OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: MAJORITY AND 
DISSENT 
Once it is determined that the EPA correctly interpreted the sta-
tutory "will endanger" test, the court must review the announced 
basis for the EPA conclusion that lead, in fact, presents a 
"significant risk of harm"84 to the general public. Although the ma-
jority and the dissent generally agree on the standard of review, they 
differ significantly in their application of the standard to the evi-
dence. The evidentiary controversies in Ethyl center on three major 
EPA findings: first, that human blood lead levels in a significant 
number of adults and children are elevated above the precautionary 
danger level of 40 ug/100 gms;85 second, that a significant correlation 
70 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
'" [d. at 596. 
" [d. at 598. 
M2 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
"' 401 U.S. at 415. 
" 541 F .2d at 12. 
~, [d. at 38. "Ug/100 gms." is scientific notation for the concentration oflead in the blood. 
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exists between auto lead emissions and human blood levels; third, 
that lead exposure from dustfall threatens the health of children. 
The EPA was confronted with conflicting evidence of whether 
blood lead levels are elevated among a significant portion of the 
public. The EPA apparently relied upon studies of occupational 
groups who had been exposed to unusually high airborne lead levels 
and who exhibited elevated blood leaq.levels.88 However, one study 
of the general urban population, the Seven Cities Study,87 found 
only a minute number of subjects (0.15%)88 with blood lead levels 
higher than 40 ug/lOO gms. The EPA rejected the Seven Cities 
Study on the methodological ground that the study failed to account 
for sources of lead other than air, such as diet.89 
The Ethyl majority affirmed the first EPA conclusion, stating 
that the various occupational studies could reasonably outweigh the 
results of the Seven Cities Study and other similar studies.90 Relying 
on a textbook, PREVENTIVE MEDICINE, 91 and Reserve Mining Co. v. 
EPA,92 the court concluded that occupational group studies can be 
used as early warnings of the long term effects of exposure to the 
general·public, and that the EPA's evaluation of the evidence was 
not arbitrary or capricious.93 
"Ug" represents the number of micrograms of lead and "100 gms." represents 100 grams of 
blood. The danger level is reached when there are 40 micrograms of lead found in every 100 
gram sample of blood tested . 
.. [d. at 40. 
H7 The Seven Cities Study was an attempt to correlate atmospheric and body lead levels 
in seven American cities. No statistically significant correlation was found. Residents of New 
York City had lower average blood lead levels than resident of Philadelphia, despite higher 
airborne lead levels in New York City. The data also showed consistent differences between 
the blood lead levels of urban and suburban dwellers within the same metropolitan area. 
Urban residents who were exposed to higher air lead concentrations invariably showed higher 
blood lead levels. However, the authors of the study concluded that urban/suburban compari-
sons ignored the influence of diet and climate. The most probable interpretation was that 
airborne lead contributes to the relatively higher blood lead concentrations in center-city 
populations. However, less than 3 out of 1,935 subjects (.15%) were found to have blood lead 
levels greater than 40 ug/100 gms. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d at 57 (App. A); 38 Fed. 
Reg. 33735 (1973) . 
.. 541 F.2d at 102. 
K' [d. at 40; see Fed. Reg. 33735 (1973). Note, however, that the rejection of the Seven 
Cities Study for its lack of dietary control was only used by the EPA to explain its conclusion 
that a correlation exists between airborne lead and blood lead. [d. The Administrator's 
comments at 38 Fed. Reg. 33734-39 (1973), do not discuss the EPA's first conclusion that 
blood lead levels are elevated among the general public. See text at note 129, infra. 
on 541 F.2d at 41 (App. A). 
" D. CLARK & B. MACMAHON, PREVENTIVE MEDICINE (1967). 
" 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). 
u:, Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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The Wilkey dissent expresses four criticisms of the EPA and ma-
jority conclusions on this point. First, the dissent asserts that the 
Administrator: 
chose among the available data without any explanation as to why - why 
he was relying upon certain studies and rejecting others . ... The court 
concludes that 'the problem here is one of choosing among the items of 
evidence.' We respectfully disagree. The problem here is one of choosing 
among the items of evidence and explaining why /94 
Second, the dissent states that with respect to the first conclusion, 
the EPA did not specifically explain its rejection of the Seven Cities 
Study, a major study of general adult urban populations. The EPA 
explained that it rejected the Seven Cities Study for failure to con-
trol dietary lead. The dissent reasoned that while that explanation 
is relevant to the second EPA conclusion that a direct correlation 
exists between airborne lead and blood lead, it is not relevant to the 
first EPA conclusion that a significant number of adults have ele-
vated blood lead levels.9s The third criticism is that the Ethyl major-
ity and not the EPA provided an explanation for the use of occupa-
tional studies and supported that explanation with a source from 
outside the record. The dissent terms the majority explanation a 
"post hoc rationalization" of the EPA decision,96 and criticizes the 
majority's use of PREVENTIVE MEDICINE, which was not mentioned in 
the agency record.97 Fourth, the dissent objects to the majority's use 
of Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA 98 for support of the use of occupa-
tional studies. The dissent asserts that in Reserve, unlike Ethyl, a 
careful analysis was made of the parallels between general and occu-
pational asbestos exposure to ensure the validity of the conclu-
sions.D9 
The EPA's second conclusion was that a direct correlation exists 
between airborne auto lead emissions and blood lead levels. In 
drawing this conclusion, the EPA accepted data from the Seven 
Cities Study to show that urban residents had higher blood lead 
levels than suburban residents of the same metropolitan area (intra-
metropolitan data). However, the EPA rejected Seven Cities data 
.. [d. at 104 (footnote omitted). 
" [d. at 103 . 
.. [d. at 104. 
" See note 92 and accompanying text, supra . 
.. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) . 
.. 541 F.2d at 105. 
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which indicated that residents of some cities had lower blood lead 
levels than residents of cities with higher ambient air lead levels 
(intermetropolitan data). The EPA reasoned that the intrametro-
politan data was more accurate than the intermetropolitan data 
because the dietary lead content, which would tend to distort any 
airborne leadlblood lead correlation, was less likely to vary within 
the same geographical area. 1011 The EPA also relied upon several 
other epidemiological studies llll as well as some persuasive clinical 
studies lll2 in drawing its conclusion. The Ethyl majority held that 
the EPA had considered all relevant factors and had rationally con-
cluded that a positive correlation exists between airborne lead and 
blood lead levels. 1II3 
The dissent claims that the EPA abused its discretion by relying 
upon epidemiological studies with no more dietary control than the 
rejected intermetropolitan Seven Cities data. 104 The dissent asserts 
that the lack of dietary control in the EPA-rejected intermetro-
politan portion of Seven Cities is no greater than the lack of dietary 
control in the EPA-accepted intrametropolitan portion. 1I15 The dis-
sent concludes that since dietary control was absent in all of the 
epidemiological studies, the rejection of some of the studies for a 
lack of control was arbitrary. 106 
The EPA's third conclusion, that young children are threatened 
by lead dustfall, rests completely upon a scientific hypothesis. The 
EPA hypothesized that dust and dirt contain a high concentration 
of settled airborne lead in urban areas and that children prone to 
eating dust (ages 1-3) can thus be expected to absorb lead.1Il7 In 
support, the EPA cited a study in which children in urban areas free 
of peeling lead paint, exhibited excessive blood lead levels. lOR The 
Ethyl majority cited Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA 109 for general sup-
port of the use of hypotheses as scientific evidence, and approved 
"'II [d. at 42; see 38 Fed. Reg. 33375 (1973). 
1111 See 541 F.2d at 57 (App. A). 
"" Two clinical studies established a correlation between airborne lead and blood lead. 
These were studies of human subjects with controlled diets and fixed exposure levels in a 
laboratory environment. [d. at 61. 
"I:I [d. at 43. 
"14 [d. at 106. 
"" [d. 
"" [d. at 105. 
1117 [d. at 43. 
111' [d. at 63 n.2 (App. B). 
,,19 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). 
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the EPA hypothesis as reasonable, valid proof under the "will en-
danger" test. 110 
The dissent criticizes the EPA's third conclusion on two grounds: 
because the dissent could not find any evidentiary support for the 
hypothesis; 111 and because children of the age group prone to eating 
dust do not play in areas such as busy streets, where airborne lead 
is likely to settle. 1I2 
The dissent's first criticism of the EPA, that it failed to explain 
why it relied upon specific items of evidence in making factual 
conclusions to support its decision to regulate automobile fuel lead 
additives, is a valid one. The Supreme Court requires such an ex-
planation as a prerequisite to meaningful judicial review under the 
§ 706(2)(A) standard. 1I3 Moreover, recent environmental cases have 
acknowledged judicial lack of technical expertise, by requiring that 
the explanation be comprehensible to laymen,IU or by requiring that 
agency action be "presented and supported in a manner capable of 
judicial understanding." 115 
South Terminal Corp. u. EPA 118 illustrates how most circuits treat 
the EPA's failure to explain its reliance on particular evidence. In 
South Terminal, the First Circuit remanded EPA regulations that 
were based upon air quality levels calculated from conflicting data. 
The court held that data, unaccompanied by an explanation for its 
selection, was insufficient to support the regulations, and ruled that 
the EPA must produce answers "demonstrating careful agency con-
sideration" of objections made during the agency proceedings. 1I7 
Other courts have remanded EPA regulations for the agency's fail-
ure to specify and explain its evidentiary reliance. liS Some courts 
have remanded where the supporting evidence, without further ex-
planation, was insufficient to justify regulation. liB The burden is on 
the EPA fully to explain its actions, but once that burden is met 
1111 541 F.2d at 46. 
III [d. at 108. 
112 [d. at 109. 
11:1 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970); Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971). 
"' American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 466 (7th Cir. 1975). 
"" DuPont v. Train, 541 F.2d 1018,1038 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 426 U.S. 947 (1976). 
118 504 F.2d 646 (tst Cir. 1974). 
117 [d. at 665. 
11M See American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1038 (10th Cir. 1976); American 
Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1063 (3d Cir. 1975); Hooker Chern. & Plastics Corp. 
v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 633-37 (2d Cir. 1976). 
II. See CPC Int'l v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1340 (8th Cir. 1976). 
1977] STANDARDS OF PROOF 243 
there is a presumption in favor of the reasonableness of the EPA 
action. 120 
. The Ethyl majority's method of reviewing the factual basis for an 
EPA decision differs markedly from that set out in Overton Park 
and subsequent cases. In Ethyl, the majority apparently examined 
the record itself and concluded that the occupational studies could 
have outweighed the other evidence. The fact that the majority felt 
compelled to go outside the record and cite PREVENTIVE MEDICINE I21 
to support its conclusion clearly indicates that the agency never 
explained its reliance upon occupational studies. The holdings in 
Overton Park, Bowman Transportation, and South Terminal re-
quire that the agency itself explain its choices among the evi-
dence,122 and that the agency itself answer serious objections to its 
choices or methodology. 123 The Ethyl court searched for any reasona-
ble evidence to support the EPA conclusion. Other courts have in-
terpreted Overton Park to require remand to the agency for a more 
complete record if the agency's reliance upon certain evidence is 
unexplained. 124 Thus, the dissent's contention that a remand is ap-
propriate for an EPA failure to explain its reliance upon occupa-
tional studies, finds considerable support in the case law. While a 
reviewing court should determine the rationality of an agency's 
technical decision, it should stop short of finding and presenting 
evidence supporting a rational basis itself.125 
The dissent's second criticism was that the EPA failed to explain 
why it rejected items of evidence directly relevant to a particular 
conclusion. The EPA must explain its rejection of relevant evidence. 
The Supreme Court in Bowman Transportation l28 required that seri-
ous objections to agency conclusions be answered in the record. l27 
, .. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971). See American 
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1037-38 (10th Cir. 1976); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 
526 F.2d 442, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1975); American Iron & Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1048-
49 (3d Cir. 1975). 
'2' Compare 541 F.2d at 41 with id. at 104. The text cited was not relied upon by the EPA 
in the Third Health Document. The majority thus introduced an outside source to support 
its conclusion. 
'22 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 419-20; South Teminal 
Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 666 (1st Cir. 1974). 
,2:1 Compare Bowman Transp. Corp. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-
86 (1974) with id. at 292-94 and South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d at 665. 
, •• See cases cited in notes 112-13, 116, supra. 
'25 419 U.S. at 285-86. 
'2' 419 U.S. 281 (1974). 
'27 [d. at 290. 
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Other courts, which demand that the EPA explain why it relied 
upon certain evidence, also require that the EPA explain why the 
chosen evidence outweighs the rejected evidence. 12M 
The dissent correctly observes that the EPA failed to explain 
rationally why it rejected the Seven Cities Study in concluding that 
a significant portion of the population have elevated blood lead 
levels. The EPA based its rejection of Seven Cities on a lack of 
dietary control. I29 Lack of dietary control is relevant to the conclu-
sion that a correlation exists between blood lead and airborne lead 
levels. However, at least to a non-expert, lack of dietary control does 
not logically bear upon whether a significant number of adults have 
elevated blood lead levels. But the majority took the EPA's explana-
tion of the airborne lead/blood lead correlation conclusion and used 
it to justify the elevated blood lead level conclusion. The court 
cannot adequately judge the rationality of the elevated blood lead 
level conclusion without an explanation of why the Seven Cities 
Study was rejected in that conclusion. Such a failure of explanation 
warrants a remand to the agency. 
The dissent's third criticism, that the explanations that were pro-
vided for reliance on particular evidence were arbitrary and unrea-
sonable, would not seem to warrant a remand. In drawing the con-
clusion that a direct correlation exists between airborne lead levels 
and blood lead levels, the EPA explained that it had rejected por-
tions of the Seven Cities Study because of geographical dietary lead 
variations, and that it had accepted studies which it felt ensured the 
highest degree of dietary lead regularity.l30 The dissent's disagree-
ment with this explanation should not be a basis for remand. In 
addition to the fact that strong clinical studies, which the dissent 
did not criticize, were available to rebut the rejected portions of 
Seven Cities, the EPA explained the rejection in a reasonable man-
ner as required. 
The dissent's fourth criticism of the EPA is that the conclusion 
concerning the effect of lead dustfall was based solely on hypothesis 
and was insufficient, by itself, to support lead additive regulation. 
However, the EPA relied upon two independent factual conclusions, 
in addition to the lead dustfall hypothesis: the airborne leadlblood 
'2K See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 665 (1st Cir. 1974); Duquesne Light 
Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186, 1196 (3d Cir. 1975); Hooker Chern. & Plastics Corp. v. Train, 537 
F.2d 620, 636 (2d Cir. 1976). 
'20 38 Fed. Reg. 33735 (1973). 
""' [d. 
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lead correlation conclusion, and the conclusion that a significant 
portion of the population has elevated blood lead levels. 131 Although 
it seems clear that the EPA cannot use an unsubstantiated hypothe-
sis as the sole basis for a given regulation, it did not attempt to do 
so in this case. 132 The two independent factual conclusions could 
have justified regulation of lead even without the reliance on hy-
pothesis. 
The Ethyl dissent criticized the majority for providing an explan-
ation of the EPA's conclusion that a significant portion of the popu-
lation has elevated blood lead levels. The majority's reliance on 
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE,133 a text not relied upon by the EPA, to sup-
port the agency's use of occupational studies was improper. Review-
ing courts may not supply an explanation for an agency decision 
that the agency itself has not provided. 134 This prohibition against 
judicial "post hoc" explanation serves two purposes: it ensures that 
courts will limit themselves to reviewing the rationality of decisions 
made by expert agencies, rather than providing the basis for techni-
cal agency decisions; and it ensures that the court will not present 
and use evidence which was unavailable to petitioners for comment. 
The majority clearly engaged in "post hoc" rationalization by 
explaining the EPA's use of occupational studies, and by supporting 
the explanation with reference to PREVENTIVE MEDICINE, an author-
ity which the manufacturers had no opportunity to challenge. 
Therefore the majority committed an error which the doctrine pro-
scribing "post hoc" explanation would prevent. 
The principle which the majority cited from PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 
has limited applicability in Ethyl. The court simply states that 
occupational studies are useful in predicting future health effects on 
the general public; it does not say that such studies are applicable 
in the case of lead poisoning. Reserve Mining, cited by the major-
ity,135 reaffirms the general usefulness of occupational studies. Such 
studies were found useful in that case, however, only after a careful 
analysis of the parallels between particular occupational studies 
131 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
132 See Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 514, 516 (8th Cir. 1975). Note that the 
Ethyl dissent's criticism of the hypothesis turns on its premise that it "cannot avoid deciding 
whether the ... hypothesis is sufficient by itself to support the regulations." 514 F.2d at 109 
(emphasis in original). 
133 See note 121, .mpra. 
'" Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974). 
"" 541 F.2d at 41. 
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and the exposure of the general populace. 1:16 The EPA, not the court, 
was obligated to produce a similar analysis for lead before it relied 
on occupational studies in Ethyl. 
Applying the § 706(2)(A) standard of review to the evidence in 
Ethyl demonstrates that the EPA was justified in finding a direct 
correlation between airborne lead levels and blood lead levels. How-
ever, its conclusion that a significant portion of the general popula-
tion has blood lead levels above the precautionary mark is doubtful, 
for the EPA did not provide a reasoned basis for this conclusion. 
Accordingly, the court should have remanded the regulations either 
for further explanation by the EPA, or for a substantiated conclu-
sion that the correlation between air lead and blood lead alone is 
sufficient to warrant regulation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress may have erred in limiting jurisdiction on appeal from 
regulations promulgated under certain sections of the Clean Air Act 
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. '37 In 
the future, this court will undoubtedly continue to rely upon the 
Ethyl precedent with respect to § 211(c)(1)(A)'38 interpretation. Yet 
several basic flaws exist in the Ethyl majority's analysis. Perhaps 
it would be more advantageous to have such cases arise in the var-
ious circuits as they would normally, thus allowing several judicial 
bodies to decide independently whether or not they agree with the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. This system assures open 
debate between the circuits which may identify a controversy ap-
propriate for resolution by the Supreme Court. 
The precedential significance of Ethyl may increase if Congress 
directs the EPA to consider regulation of high sulfur auto fuel. 139 
Such an amendment to the Clean Air Act was recently proposed in 
Congress, but failed to pass before the October 1976 adjournment. 
With the potential economic consequences of such restrictions, the 
EPA must carefully investigate and explain promulgation of regula-
tions as necessary to protect the public health. A careful analysis 
",. 514 F.2d at 511-12. 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(l) (1970). 
'" The Clean Air Act, § 211(c)(I)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6(c)(I)(A) (1970). 
'" The sulfur content of diesel fuel could be regulated under § 211(c)(I)(A). Section 214 of 
a recent bill, S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 122 CONGo REc. H11894 (daily ed. Sept. 
30, 1976), directed the EPA to study and report on the effects of sulfur emissions from motor 
vehicles and on the possibility of regulating fuel sulfur content. 
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of the environmental cases in which regulations were overturned 
reveals that a lack of clear explanation or response on the part of 
the EPA is not an uncommon failing. Unfortunately, the Ethyl deci-
sion, by adopting an overly permissive evidentiary standard and by 
upholding regulations in the absence of clear support in the record, 
is not a step in the right direction. 
